The session, structured like a four-quarter football game with overtime, offered invaluable takeaways for utilities, regulators, and investors contemplating nuclear power as part of the energy transition.
The journey began in 2005 with optimism fueled by President Bush’s Energy Policy Act, which incentivized new nuclear builds. Georgia Power, Southern Company, and public utilities formed a consortium to construct two new units at the existing Vogtle site.
Lesson 1: Choose partners wisely. “Things are not always sunshine and rainbows,” Higgins warned, underscoring the need for consortium alignment through adversity.
The original budget was $4.2 billion with completion targets of 2016 and 2017. The fixed-price construction contract, at first seen as a safeguard, proved to be a double-edged sword.
Lesson 2: If a deal seems too good to be true, it probably is.
In what Higgins termed the “Fukushima fumble,” the 2011 disaster caused global hesitation on nuclear projects. Even prior to that, unexpected on-site challenges emerged, such as the need to remove and replace unsuitable soil despite the site's legacy as a nuclear facility.
Lesson 4: Always expect the unexpected.
Additional hurdles included regulatory delays, endangered species relocations, and a fragmented contractor landscape. Over the years, contractors rotated through the project in what Higgins likened to the “college football transfer portal,” with players including Shaw, Chicago Bridge & Iron, and Westinghouse.
By 2017, Westinghouse filed for bankruptcy, with Toshiba, the parent company, on the brink of insolvency.
Lesson 7: Credit support matters. Fortunately, the consortium had secured a $4 billion parent guarantee to protect against such catastrophic outcomes.
Post-bankruptcy, the project transitioned from fixed-price to time-and-materials contracts under new leadership from Southern Nuclear and Bechtel.
Lesson 8: When the business deal changes, reassert control. The consortium established “break points” for cost overruns or schedule slippages to mitigate runaway spending. Despite these measures, costs ballooned again.
By 2019, with 8,000 workers on-site at times, the project still faced skilled labor shortages and COVID-19 disruptions. Georgia’s policies allowed work to continue with on-site medical trailers, a move Higgins credited as pivotal.
Lesson 9: Align realistic internal and external schedules. The consortium adopted both an aggressive “site schedule” and a conservative, risk-adjusted schedule for financial reporting.
Unit 3 finally came online in July 2023, followed by Unit 4 less than a year later.
The final project cost reached $8.3 billion—nearly double the original estimate—with a seven-year delay. The installed cost was $11,000 per kilowatt, equating to about $0.16 per kilowatt hour, reduced to the low $0.14 range with production tax credits for eight years.
Yet, Higgins remains proud.
“We overcame Fukushima, Westinghouse bankruptcy, enormous schedule and cost overruns, and COVID-19,” she said. Vogtle’s nuclear generation has raised the consortium’s emission-free portfolio from 32% to 44%.
Despite the governor’s call for “Vogtle 5,” Higgins signaled caution: “We’re glad we have it behind us. We aren’t chomping at the bit to do another one just yet.”
The Vogtle case provides critical benchmarks for future nuclear and large-scale energy infrastructure projects:
